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During the wars of Yugoslav succession, nationalists on all sides maintained that it
was impossible for different national groups to live together in harmony in a
democratic society. They spoke of “age-old hatreds,” pointing to an historical
landscape littered with international conflicts, civil wars, rebellions, or individual
acts of violence between the region’s national and ethnic groups. Moreover, after
a decade of continuous confrontation between former Yugoslavia’s constituent
nationalities, an increasing number of foreign observers are inclined to agree. After
all, the “democratization” process has been attended by the abrupt, acrimonious,
and sometimes violent dissolution of multiethnic societies throughout the formerly
Communist eastern half of Europe. Thus, one of the first consequences of glasnost
and perestroika in the USSR was the secession of the three Baltic states, a step
followed by all of the once vaunted Soviet empire’s constituent republics. The
“democratic process” certainly played a role in these events. As a rule, populist
politicians quickly exploited the post-Communist world’s first “free elections” to
marshal the power of those national groups which constituted a majority of their
countries’ voters. In central Europe, the seemingly inevitable result was Czechoslo-
vakia’s velvet divorce and Yugoslavia’s bloody dissolution. To the dismay of the inter-
national community, postwar “free” elections in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo
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have reaffirmed and formalized the process of ethnic disaggregation. If they remain
discrete political entities, it is only because the creation of hastily constructed, but
officially sanctified, international protectorates. Even in ostensibly sovereign countries
like Bulgaria, Romania, and especially Macedonia, national political leaders are quietly
induced to adopt multicultural policies by being given access to foreign loans and
the promise of integration into NATO and the EU. Needless to say, these realities
have emboldened the fatalism of those nationalist scholars and politicians who
argue that multicultural societies can only survive within an authoritarian political
system.
In reality, democratic, multiethnic states can be made viable, but only if their
political and cultural elites learn from the reasonably successful experiences of those
past and contemporary societies – including their own – that have proven the
efficacy of multiethnic coexistence. This can, however, only be achieved by applying
more balanced and sophisticated understanding both of their own history and of
democracy itself. Indeed, only by incorporating the nuances in their nation’s historical
narrative and adopting a more multifaceted blueprint for democratization can the
peoples of the former Yugoslavia prevent the negativism of nationalist elites from
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Admittedly, such optimism is justified less from the study of the contemporary
Balkans than from the rather different perspective of an historian, particularly one
familiar with the multiethnic societies of the Habsburg monarchy. By analyzing the
dynamics of the interethnic relations within the monarchy (and a select number of
today’s democracies) we can ascertain both a “positive history” that justifies our
confidence at the same time as it warns us of the potential for intensifying conflict
that attends the democratization process in mutliethnic polities.
To a great extent, any judgment of the viability of multiethnic democracies hinges
on a series of definitions that need to be clearly understood.
1. Above all, we need to recognize that evaluating the success or failure of any
government is a highly subjective process. Since all human institutions sustain at
least some degree of injustice, it is possible to condemn any regime by focusing
solely on its shortcomings, while minimizing or overlooking its achievements altoge-
ther. Hence the need to adopt a strictly utilitarian approach that judges “success”
or “failure” only after weighing and comparing the sum total of positive and negative
consequences of multiethnic coexistence within a particular democratic system.
2. Whether the scales tip in one direction or another also depends on how we
define oppression, a term that has served as a catch-all for describing the suffering
of those ethnic minorities whose lot it has been to coexist with other, dominant
groups. This is no easy task. There are different degrees of oppression that can
range from cultural insensitivity and the mere perception of discrimination or “second-
class” status, to blatantly unequal access to education, jobs, public services, voting,
and the protection of law. Nor is “oppression” merely something tangible, like a
regime of policies and statutes, but can also be a state of mind governed by percep-
tions and paranoia that are simply beyond precise calculation. Despite such impon-
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derables, it is useful to articulate the level and approximate the weight of “oppression”
so that it can be compared against the positive attributes of multiethnic coexistence.
3. Indeed, the very term multiethnicity demands more precise definition, since
the prospects for successful, democratic coexistence vary according to the actual mix
between different ethnic groups. In this vein, I would posit three discrete demo-
graphic models:2 (a) culturally homogenous societies, which are ostensibly free of
ethnic conflict, but whose lack of exposure to diversity renders them much less
tolerant either toward the small minorities in their midst or toward new immigrants
who subsequently enter it; thus the challenges that faced ethnically homogenous
Serbia, Greece and Romania upon their dramatic expansion (1912-1919), or contem-
porary western Europe and Japan, (b) multicultural societies in which at least one
ethnic group is perceived to exercise or aspire to hegemony over the others; the
experiences of modern-day Canada, Northern Ireland, Switzerland and the USA de-
monstrate that such a fundamentally unstable ensemble can be sustained only if the
dominant national group continuously demonstrates a willingness to accommodate
minority aspirations, and (c) multicultural societies, in which no single group enjoys
political, economic, or cultural preponderance, thereby creating a balance of power
that defuses the paranoia of ethnic minorities by compelling all groups to forge a
multilateral consensus (Habsburg Cisleithania,3 Tito’s Yugoslavia,4 and modern India)
that can survive the intense competition of democratic politics.
4. But what exactly is democracy? In most of the world – and certainly within the
newly “democratic” states of central and eastern Europe – it implies popular sovere-
ignty, as expressed by free elections and, perhaps, a free press. Indeed, this
prescription also enjoys currency among those western officials who have seen it as
a panacea for the newly independent countries of the post-Communist world. Alas,
such a simple definition has repeatedly paved the way for the tyranny of the majority
and a chain reaction of revolt and secession by ever smaller groups of “threatened”
minorities in Slovenia and Croatia, followed by the Krajina (1991); in Bosnia and
Macedonia, followed by Republika Srpska (1992), Herceg-Bosna (1993) and western
Macedonia (2001); and in Kosovo, followed by the Mitrovica (1999) and Preševo-
-Bujanovac-Biljaèa (2000) pockets.
If many modern multiethnic democracies have been spared from this process of
disaggregation, it is because they have embraced and internalized “democratic”
values that go far beyond the simple definition of the term to embody a full
complement of Enlightenment values. Perhaps the most important attribute is the
2 Charles Ingrao, “Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe: an Historical Perspective,”
Nationalities Papers, 27:2 (June, 1999), 291-318, 331-32.  Expanded Serbo-Croatian edition:
“Deset nenauèenih lekcija o Srednjoj Evropi – pogled istorièara,” in Charles Ingrao and
Lazar Vrkatiæ, Nenauèena Lekcija: srednjoeuropska ideja I srpski nacionalni program
(International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights – Belgrade, 2001), 7-36.
3 “Cisleithania” refers to the Austrian half of the Habsburg dual monarchy (1867-1918).
4 For Tito’s achievement in institutionalizing such a balance of power within Yugoslavia, see
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rule of law – applied with equity by a government staffed by professional admini-
strative and judicial officials – because it eliminates the element of fear that has
driven so many rebellious and secessionist ethnic minorities. To be sure, the rule of
law is hardly a monopoly of democratic regimes, enjoying as it does a pedigree that
can be traced back to pre-modern monarchs like Hammurabi, Justinian, and Suleiman
the Magnificent; indeed, more immediate influences are evident in the contractualism
of the feudal system of Latin Christendom, out of which western constitutionalism
took shape. Equity is also a common commodity among non-democratic govern-
ments, especially those like Habsburg Cisleithania and Tito’s Yugoslavia, both of
which maintained stability by balancing the interests of competing national groups.
A second key attribute is a shared national identity that justifies and protects all
citizens equally, regardless of coexisting cultural or sectional markers.  And this
common identity is fostered by a shared historical narrative that celebrates the
contribution of all groups, not just that of a single, “state-forming” nation. A third,
requisite value is tolerance for the rights of the individual, to the exclusion of negative
group stereotypes and discrimination (or preferences). Such forbearance is especially
crucial for those citizens who belong to a majority group, which must accept as the
price of its electoral preeminence the need to accommodate the “personal autono-
my” of the minorities in its midst. Thus the lot of Cisleithania in its difficult partnership
with Hungary partner, and of Anglo-Canada, which patiently endures the continuous
stream of French demands that Quebecois leader Rene Levesque has characterized
as “the never-sending trip to the dentist” – because the alternative is immediate
secession and the specter of civil war. Such stoicism also implies the recognition that
a certain degree of interethnic tension will always exist within a diverse society, but
that it can be kept below the surface of everyday life because the protection afforded
by the rule of law eliminates fear of the ethnic “other”. Hence, the paradox of
striving to maintain what Austrian Prime Minister Eduard Taaffe termed “well-tem-
pered discontent” among competing ethnic groups, all of which readily bear their
own grievances in the knowledge that theirs are not out of proportion either to
the burdens borne by other groups or to the greater overall advantages derived
from coexisting in a single commonwealth.
5. Exactly how these corporate groups form demands one last definition, that of
national identity itself. After a century of discourse about inbred, primordial markers
that somehow predetermine an individual’s identity, social scientists have belatedly
come to understand national identity as a contingent, cultural construct that can be
molded to exclude/include people of different ethnicities. Such adaptability manifests
itself not only in “immigrant societies” like the United States and Canada, but even
within the pantheon of central European nationalist leaders, many of whom have
forsaken their ancestral roots to lead the peoples of their adopted country.5 Moreover,
individual identity is not only a malleable commodity, but a multifaceted construct
5 Such as the ethnic Slovak Lajos Kossuth, Croat Vojislav Šešelj, Montenegrins Slobodan Miloševiæ
and Radovan Karad<iæ, and numerous descendants of German colonists like Vitus Landsbergis,
Vaclav Klaus, and Franjo Tudjman.
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capable of housing multiple, mutually compatible “identities” based not just on
linguistic, but confessional, regional, ideological, professional, and other cultural
attributes. Rather than accepting the inevitability of group conflict, it would appear
both more logical and socially constructive to recognize that societies can freely
choose between nurturing a single “imagined community” that accommodates all
citizens, or one that segregates them into two or more mutually hostile camps.6
   This is the choice that has rested in the hands of regional cultural elites that have
so thoroughly dominated the all-important “public sphere”over the past two
centuries. Whether scholars, theologians, poets, political leaders, or merely the
journalists who mediated their discourse, these elites have set the definitions,
established the parameters for judging a societya’s or government’s viability, judged
its “success” or “failure” and, ultimately, written— or rewritten – the history books
to justify and legitimize their verdict. And it is their highly subjective assessments,
both in the past and the present, that have undermined the stability of the central
European world by dismissing regimes and societies as dysfunctional when, in fact,
it was the elites’ conceptual framework that was incompatible with reality.
Surely the leaders of central Europe’s multinational states could have done more
to promote the very real advantages that they offered their ethnically diverse polities.
They failed above all to establish a broadly inclusive national identity, largely because
the perception of inequality sustained competing ethnic identities. Such a synthesis
was totally alien to the state ideology of the Ottoman empire, which counted among
its many disabilities its commitment to the hegemony of Ottoman despotism and
Muslim theocracy, together with the special station that its Turkish subjects held
within them. It was also beyond the comprehension of a string of stubbornly
conservative Habsburg emperors who equated mass politics and popular sovereignty
with Jacobin anarchy.  Even when Francis Joseph felt compelled to introduce “a
little parliamentarism” in the 1860s, he fashioned legislative majorities by pandering
to the special interests of corporate groups, rather than by articulating a broad
agenda that could forge a consensus that cut across ethnic, religious or class affinities;
thus his initial reliance on Austria’s German liberals (1861-1879), then on their Cat-
holic and Slav adversaries (1879-1893), while never abandoning his support for the
tyranny of Hungary’s Magyar majority.7  Nor did the multiethnic successor states of
the twentieth century fully comprehend that a common identity could only be
achieved by persuading all citizens that they were equally justified regardless of
their diverse cultural attributes. Thus Thomas Masaryk’s sublime vision of equal
justification for all citizens was fatally undermined by a choice of nomenclature that
placed Czechs and Slovaks ahead of his country’s significant German, Magyar, Ruthene
and Polish minorities, much as the Czechs’ demographic dominance created a
systemic imbalance that always troubled the supposedly co-equal Slovaks; the
6 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Naitonalism (2nd ed: London & New York, 1991)
7 Steven Beller, Francis Joseph (London & New York, 1996) 80-84, 97-107.
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incremental departure of Czechoslovakia’s German, Magyar, Polish and Ruthene
minorities only intensified Slovak insecurities until they too seceded. The interwar
kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes recognized only three constituent nations,
then invested the country’s ethnic Serb plurality with an outright majority in all
branches of government, including military commands. Even the rigorously supra-
national ideology of the Soviet Union failed to wholly eliminate the perception of
all national groups that the Great Russians stood at the top of a pecking order
dominated by its Europeans and Orthodox Christians. Although Tito’s Yugoslavia
came the closest to creating a common identity, Serbia’s cultural elites resented and
ultimately defeated the requisite strategy of “strong Yugoslavia, weak Serbia” because
they could not accept the burden of accommodating the aspirations or assuaging
the anxieties of the federation’s smaller national groups.
The supranational regimes’ failure to establish a single, overriding national identity
created an opportunity for cultural and political leaders to propound a competing
synthesis that stressed ethnic identity and the uncritical adoption of the western,
nation-state model. But most had “succeeded” nonetheless in building a generally
functional political, economic and social system that compared favorably to the
available alternatives. Austria-Hungary, both Czechoslovakias, and the first Yugoslavia
offered substantially better national security and economic benefits than the
countries that replaced them, as did the Soviet Union and second Yugoslavia right
up until the moment that their successor states introduced meaningful free market
reforms.8 They also succeeded in limiting interethnic conflict to levels that encouraged
compromise, while preventing the kind of violence that would follow their demise.
At worst, Habsburg Austria was afflicted by chronic parliamentary paralysis, occasional
economic boycotts, and a lot of angry rhetoric; Czechoslovakia by long--standing
Slovak resentment over inequities that had much more to do with historic
macroeconomic differences than with conscious government policy; second
Yugoslavia primarily by Slovene and Croat unwillingness to sacrifice their greater
wealth and early entry into the European Community for the sake of the other
republics. Yet this was enough to mobilize the forces of secession – and seize the
imagination of cultural elites who readily placed at risk the tangible advantages of
a reasonably tolerable status quo in order to pursue a charismatic, but unknown
national destiny. Their enthusiasm for a separate existence simply overwhelmed the
logical arguments of unionist forces, who could promise nothing more exhilarating
than continued ethnic coexistence, economic integration, stability and, in the case
of Yugoslavia, massive international financial aid. It was a victory of emotion over
reason that was easily reaffirmed at the ballot box in the region’s newly, though
imperfectly formed, democracies. Like so many others before and around them,
the Yugoslav peoples leapt without looking beyond the rhetoric of nationalist
politicians, intellectuals and media who led them into the abyss.
8 Michael Palairet, The Balkan Economies c. 1800-1914 (Cambridge, 1997) demonstrates that
even the Ottoman economy outperformed those of the Balkan states that emerged at the
beginning of the twentieth century.
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Admittedly, not everyone followed their lead. Incumbent leaders ranging from
Emperor Charles I and Prince Paul to Mikhail Gorbachev, Ante Markoviæ and Vaclav
Havel retained the support of some middle- and upper-level political and military
officials. The survival of a multiethnic polity also inspired “stateless” minorities like
the Habsburg  Jews and Muslim Slavs who appreciated the opportunity to affect an
all-inclusive state identity that preempted the employment of ethnic labels and racist
stereotypes.9 It is also plausible to assume that many ethnically mixed families opposed
dissolution. In all these instances, however, the support was so passive that it cannot
even be measured. Alas, the only active opposition to ethnic disaggregation came
from those members of formerly dominant nations like the Croatian-, Bosnian- and
Kosovar-Serbs, or Baltic-, Ukrainian- and Moldovan-Russians who feared becoming
a minority in a newly formed successor state; although they may have advocated
and fought to preserve a larger multiethnic union, they did so mainly because they
were unwilling to exchange what they perceived as their special station for the lot
of a defenseless minority.
Of course, the plight of “new” minorities such as “stateless” Jews and Muslims or
the Russian and Serb diasporae reminds us that the proponents of ethnically
homogenous nation-states have rarely achieved their objective without implementing
massive population exchanges. More often, they have merely converted formerly
demographically balanced societies that affected a certain level of equity and
accommodation into putative “nation-states” with significant residual minorities
that were now at the mercy of a single, previously aggrieved national group. Of
course, this is not the way the successor states’ cultural elites have been portrayed
independence. Not unlike a physician who kills his patient, they have successfully
buried the body beneath a formidable ensemble of self-serving public media, ranging
from scholarly tomes and school textbooks to public holidays and memorials, that
obliterate the positive legacy of multiethnic coexistence while stressing the state-
forming nation’s long, but just struggle against foreign oppression and competing
national groups.  Thus, Czechoslovakia began a lengthy process of obliterating its
substantial German heritage a quarter-century prior to the mass expulsions of 1945
by removing figures from monuments and German-language inscriptions from public
plaques, while eliminating any positive mention of their presence from history books.
One of the few exceptions has been their misrepresentation of the Thirty Years’
War as a struggle between Germans and Czechs, rather than between Catholic
loyalists and Protestant rebels. Poles mourn the demise of their historic kingdom at
the hands of German, Russian, Swedish, Ukrainian and Turkish enemies, without
recognizing that it was a great confederation that accommodated many languages
and religions. Modern Albanian and Slovak textbooks speak of oppression by Turkish
and Hungarian overlords, without explaining why their forefathers fought in vain
to prevent their “liberation” by Serb and Czech forces. Serbs extol their heroic
struggles against the oppression of their Turkish, German, Hungarian and Croatian
9 Marsha Rozenblit, Reconstructing a National Identity: the Jews of Habsburg Austria during
World War I (Oxford, 2001).
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enemies, while ignoring centuries of peaceful coexistence with all of these groups
in the Vojvodina, Slavonia, Sand<ak and Bosnia. Thus the official history of Vojvodina
extols the Serbian national awakening and the bloody 1848 revolt against Hungary,
while glossing over the half-century of peaceful and, therefore, anonymous
coexistence that attended its aftermath.10 Nor is this heretofore successful exercise
in collective amnesia likely to change at a time when none of the professional staff
at Vojvodina’s central archive can read German, Magyar, Romanian, Yiddish, or any
of the northern Slavic languages. So complete is the blackout of alternative accounts
that a recent translation of A.J.P. Taylor’s classic Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918
became the first book on the subject ever published by a Serbian press – albeit only
after it was commissioned and paid for by the Soros Foundation.
Although the region’s politicians, intelligentsia and media no longer promote
what Oslobodjenje’s wartime editor Gordana Kne<eviæ once characterized as an
“industry of hate,” the same consortium of cultural elites continue the discourse of
disaggregation in the last state to succeed from the former Yugoslavia. Today’s
Montenegro seems destined to follow in the footsteps of the first Austrian republic,
which readily abandoned its separate national identity in order to unite in an
ethnically homogenous nation-state during the interwar period. Like Hitler’s Ostmark
during World War II, Montenegro fought in the wars of Yugoslav Succession without
questioning its greater national identity until it faced the dual specters of military
defeat and international condemnation for the commission of war crimes. Much as
the Austrians rediscovered their nationhood on the retreat from Stalingrad,11 the
Montenegrins rediscovered their separate identity on the road back from Dubrovnik,
as a means of escaping the consequences of defeat and the charge of complicity in
the crimes committed across Croatia, Bosnia and, ultimately, Kosovo. In the process,
they ignored the inconvenient fact that Serbian leaders Slobodan Miloševiæ and
Radovan Karad<iæ were of Montenegrin origin, much as Adolf Hitler himself was an
Austrian.
Of course, Montenegro stands barely at the threshold of a transformation process
that took a generation for the Austrians to complete. But the process of
reconstructing the past to justify secessionist aspirations is a familiar one that has
been traveled by central Europe’s cultural elites for over a century. Perhaps it is time
for the region’s politicians and academics to reevaluate the trajectory of their national
historical narrative. As they contemplate the utility of economic integration with
the New Europe, they should consider that their counterparts within the European
Union are traveling in the opposite direction by promoting shared universal values
that define the complex dimensions of democracy that have enabled western
Europeans and their overseas progeny to peacefully accommodate great cultural
diversity, whether in the immigrant societies in the New World or in the mobile
post-industrial workplace. Along the way, they might reexamine their history in
order to represent more faithfully the long record of peaceful and constructive
10 Dimitrije Boarov, Politièka Istorija Vojvodine, (Novi Sad, 2001).
11 Peter Thaler, The Ambivalence of Identity (West Lafayette, 2000), vii.
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coexistence. Intrinsic to such an endeavor is the accommodation of the historical
documentation and narratives of the other national and ethnic groups with whom
they have interacted and without whom there can be no accurate representation
of their own heritage.

